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Suppose that we have successfully estimated a structural model of  labor 
supply.  Given  the large amount of  public  interest in  the question  of 
income tax reform, an important use of the estimated model would be to 
assess the possible effects of proposed reforms on the labor supply, tax 
revenues, and individual welfare. These evaluations are sometimes per- 
formed using local elasticity estimates. However, such a simplified analy- 
sis may not be very accurate for the rather large changes contemplated in 
many tax reform proposals. Another problem with simplified elasticity 
calculations is that they often ignore the considerable heterogeneity of 
the population response. A better approach would seem to be to use the 
estimated structural model to predict the effect of the tax changes. Thus 
we would  need to derive analytically the statistical expectation of  the 
population response under the proposed changes; or if analytical deriva- 
tion proves to be mathematically intractable, a Monte Carlo approach 
would provide the results. 
But an important potential problem arises when such simulations are 
conducted. This  problem arises because  of  the nonlinear,  and often 
nonconvex, budget sets which are a consequence of progressive income 
taxation as well as other tax and transfer policies. In a nonlinear econo- 
metric model with nonlinearities of  this type, it is not necessarily the case 
that the sources of  stochastic variation have an additive zero expectation 
term within a simulation exercise. Nor is it the case that such effects are 
necessarily small, since R2  values in labor supply models are typically not 
that high; i.e. much  unexplained  residual  variation remains after the 
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model has been specified and estimated. Thus for a particular individual 
we might well expect that careful treatment of the stochastic specification 
in calculating the appropriate expectation would be quite important. Yet 
for the population at large, or, equivalently, a very large sample, the 
importance of  the stochastic components is unclear. In the sample, if  the 
variation of the exogenous variable is sufficiently large and the fit of the 
equation sufficiently good, the effect of the stochastic component may be 
small. Perhaps a more promising approach is to realize that extremely 
accurate computation for each individual may not be needed, because a 
law-of-large-numbers type of result may hold for the entire sample. That 
is, rather crude computational techniques may be used for each indi- 
vidual, but the sample mean values can still be quite accurate. Significant 
computational savings occur because say only one Monte Carlo draw is 
done for each individual. While the variance of the predicted response of 
that given individual may be large, in the complete sample the large 
variance  may  not  be  important, because  of  a  large-number  type  of 
averaging. This sort of technical question is the major focus of  this paper. 
The plan of  the paper is as follows. In section 2.1, we outline the 
problem of  labor supply with  nonlinear  budget  constraints.  We  also 
specify and use estimates of  a linear supply model. This section and the 
estimates within  it follow from Hausman (1981b). In section 2.2, the 
stochastic problems which  arise in simulation of  nonlinear  budget set 
models are studied. Both analytical and Monte Carlo approaches are 
considered. Comparative statistics for computer times are given to indi- 
cate potential savings from the use of simple computational techniques. 
Then, in section 2.3, we consider tax reform proposals. The type of tax 
reform proposal considered is a reduction of  tax rates by 10% to 30%. 
Here not only do  we consider labor supply effects and welfare effects, but 
also we look at tax revenue considerations. It is important to emphasize 
at the outset that all analysis takes place within a partial equilibrium 
framework. Thus  general  equilibrium effects which might be quite impor- 
tant, especially in long-run response, are not treated. 
2.1  The Econometrics of Labor Supply with Taxes 
The essential feature which distinguishes econometric models of  labor 
supply with taxes from traditional demand models is the nonconstancy of 
the net, after-tax  wage. Except for the case of a proportional tax system, 
the net wage depends on hours worked because of  the operation of  the 
tax system. Also, the marginal net wage depends on the specific budget 
segment that the individual’s  indifference  curve  is  tangent to.  Thus 
econometric  techniques need to be devised which can treat the nonlinear- 
ity of the budget set. An econometric  model needs to take the exogenous 
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We first describe such a model for convex and nonconvex budget sets. As 
expected, the convex case is simpler to deal with. We then consider other 
issues of  model specification such as variation in tastes and fixed costs to 
working. 
Econometric estimation is quite straightforward in the case of a convex 
budget set. Convex budget sets arise from the operation of  a progressive 
tax system. Let us first analyze the simplest case, that of  a progressive tax 
on labor income so that the marginal tax rate is nondecreasing. In figure 
2.1 three marginal tax rates are considered, tl, t2,  t3,  which lead to three 
after-tax  net wages, wl, w2,  w3,  where wi  = w(1 -  ti). y,  denotes  nonlabor 
income. HI and H2 correspond to kink point hours which occur at the 
intersection of  two tax brackets. But an important addition to the dia- 
gram are the “virtual” incomes y2  and y3,  which follow from extension of 
a given budget segment to the vertical axis. They are denoted as virtual 
income because if the individual faced the linear budget set B2 = (w2,y2), 
he would still choose hours of work h* as in figure 2.1. An important 
property of  such convex budget sets in the presence of  strictly quasi- 
concave preferences  is that only one  tangency (at most) will exist between 
the individual indifference curves and the budget set. Hausman (1979) 
uses this result to  demonstrate that only a specification of the labor supply 
-H 
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function is necessary for estimation. The form of  the underlying utility 
function is not necessary. 
Since a unique tangency or a corner solution at zero hours will deter- 
mine desired hours of work, we need only determine where the tangency 
occurs. To  do so we begin with a slight generalization of the usual type of 
labor supply specification: 
(1.1) 
where w is a vector of net wages, y is a vector of virtual incomes, z are 
individual socioeconomic variables,  p is the unknown vector of  coef- 
ficients assumed fixed over the population, and E is a stochastic term 
which  represents the divergence between  desired hours h* and actual 
hours. The  typical specification that has been used in g(  ) is linear or log 
linear and scalar w and y corresponding to  the market wage and nonlabor 
income. The stochastic term is assumed to have classical properties 50 
that no quantity constraints on hours worked exists. However, 01  h I  H, 
where H is a physical maximum to hours worked. We also assume that 
when the p are estimated  the Slutsky conditions are satisfied so that g(  ) 
arises from concave preferences. 
The problem to be solved is to  find h* when the individual is faced with 
the convex budget  set B  for  i = 1, . . . ,  m. To find h* we take the 
specification of  desired hours on a given budget segment B,: 
h =  g(w,y,z,P) +  E = h* + E , 
(1.2)  hT= g(w,lYltz,P) . 
Calculate h;;  if  0 5  hf 5  HI,  where the H, are kink point hours in figure 
2.1, then hf  is feasible and represents the unique tangency of the indiffer- 
ence curves and the budget set. If  hT I  0, then zero hours is the desired 
amount of  work. However, if h* exceeds H1,  it is not feasible, so we move 
on to try the next budget segment. If H1  5  h$  (H2,  we again would have 
the unique optimum. If  we have bracketed the kink point so that hf >  H, 
and hT<H,,  then h* = HI  so that desired hours fall at the kink point. 
Otherwise we go on and calculate h;.  By trying out all the segments we 
will either find a tangency of  find that h:>Hffor  all I,  in which case 
h* = H.  Then a nonlinear least squares procedure or  Tobit procedure to 
take account  of  a  minimum  at zero should  be used  to compute the 
unknown P parameters. The statistical procedure would basically mini- 
mize the sum of Ey=  (h, -  h,*)2, where j  represents individuals in the 
sample. Perhaps  a better technique would be to  use Tobit,  which enforces 
the constraint that h,  2  0. 
The case of the nonconvex budget is more complicated because equa- 
tion (1.2) can lead to more than one feasible tangency, which leads to 
many potential values of hf. Nonconvex budget sets arise from the pres- 
ence of  government transfer programs.  The four most important pro- 
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(AFDC), social security benefits, and a negative income tax (NIT) pro- 
gram. In figure 2.2, in which we indicate a common type of  nonconvex 
budget set, we have two tangencies of  the indifference curves with the 
budget set. 
How can we decide which of  these feasible hTis the global optimum? 
Burtless and Hausman (1978) initially demonstrated the technique  of 
working backward from the labor supply specification  of equation (1.2) to 
the underlying preferences, which can be represented by a utility func- 
tion. The basic idea was to make use of Roy’s identity, which generated 
the labor supply function from the indirect utility function v(wi,yj): 
along a given budget segment. So long as the Slutsky condition holds, 
v(w,,y,)  can be recovered by  solving the differential equation (1.3). In 
fact, v(  ) often has a quite simple closed form for commonly used labor 
supply specifications. 
For the linear supply specification hT= awi + pyi + zy which is used in 
this paper, Hausman (1980) solved for the indirect utility function: 
-H 
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Given the indirect utility function, all of the feasible tangencies can be 
compared, and the tangency with highest utility is chosen as the preferred 
hours of work h*.  Then, as with the convex budget set case, we can use 
either nonlinear  least  squares or a  Tobit  procedure  to estimate  the 
unknown  coefficients. While using  a  specific parameterization  of  the 
utility function is upsetting to some people, it should be realized that 
setting down a labor supply function as in equation (1.2) is equivalent to 
setting down a utility function under the assumption of  utility maximiza- 
tion. To the extent that the labor supply specification yields a robust 
approximation to  the data, the associated utility function will also provide 
a good approximation to the underlying preferences. The utility function 
allows us to make the global comparisons to determine the preferred 
hours of labor supply. The convex case needs only local comparisons, but 
the nonconvex case requires global comparisons because of  the possibil- 
ity of  multiple tangencies of  indifference curves with the budget set. 
We next introduce the possibility of variation in tastes. In the labor 
supply specification of equation (1.  1),  all individuals are assumed to  have 
identical values of  P so that variation of observationally equivalent indi- 
viduals must arise solely from E. However, empirical studies seem to do 
an  inadequate job of  explaining  observed hours of  work  under  the 
assumption  of  the  representative  individual.  Burtless  and  Hausman 
(1978) allowed for variation in preferences by permitting P to be ran- 
domly distributed in the population. Their results indicated that variation 
in P seemed more important than variation in a.  They also found that 
variation in  P represented approximately  eight times as much of  the 
unexplained variance as did variation  in  E. An even more satisfactory 
procedure would  be to allow  all the taste  coefficients  to vary  in  the 
population. At present the requirement of  evaluating multiple integrals 
over nonrectangular regions for the more general specification has led to 
the use of  the simple case of  variation of  one or two taste coefficients. 
Further research  is needed to determine whether this more complex 
specification would be an important improvement over current models. 
Another consideration which  can have  an important  effect  on the 
budget set for women’s labor force participation is fixed costs of  working. 
Transportation costs, the presence of young children, and search costs of 
finding a job can lead to a fixed cost element in the labor supply decision. 
The basic effect of  fixed costs is to introduce a nonconvexity in the budget 
set at the origin. Thus, even if  the original budget is convex as in figure 
2.1, the presence of  fixed costs leads to a minimum number of  hours H,, 
which depends on the wage below which an individual will not choose to 
work. In figure 2.3  nonlabor income isy,, with the original convex budget 




lowers the effective budget set to the pointy, -  FC. The individual would 
not choose to work fewer than Ho hours because she would be better off 
at zero hours. This nonconvexity invalidates the simple reservation wage 
theory of labor force participation since hours also need to be accounted 
for. Hausman  (1980) in  a labor force participation  study of  welfare 
mothers found average fixed costs to be on the order of $100 per month. 
The importance of fixed costs could explain the often noted empirical fact 
that very few individuals are observed working fewer than ten or fifteen 
hours per week. 
We estimated a model of  labor supply (Hausman 1981b) which takes 
full account of the effect of taxation for two groups in the population. The 
labor supply of  husbands and wives is considered for 1975 for a sample 
from the Michigan Income Dynamics Data. Budget sets were constructed 
using both federal and state tax regulations (cf. Hausman 1981b). It is 
important to note that we did not have access to actual tax return data. 
Instead, we imputed deductions beyond the standard deduction using 
population averages. At present no data source has both all the necessary 
labor supply data and actual income tax return information.' At  the 
1. Sample  selection criteria and budget  set  assumptions are  discussed in  Hausman 
(19816). We note that farmers, the self-employed, and severely disabled individuals are 
excluded from the sample. Potential problems of tax evasion and tax avoidance should be 
decreased by our sample selection procedures. Also, for families with incomes which place 54  Jerry A. Hausman 
current stage of model development only a single person can be consid- 
ered so that the husband was treated as the primary worker in a family, 
with  a wife as the secondary worker.  A model which allows for joint 
family labor supply decisions seems the obvious next goal of  our research. 
For both husbands and wives we consider each of  two cases: a convex 
budget set where the effects of FICA, the earned income credit, and the 
standard deduction are averaged to produce a convex budget set and a 
complete nonconvex budget set where the effect of  each program is to 
introduce a nonconvexity. 
Along each segment the basic labor supply model used  is linear in 
wages and virtual income: 
hT= awi + pyi + zy , 
where hTis desired hours, w,  is the net wage on segment i, y,  is virtual 
income for segment i, and z are socioeconomic variables. For fixed a,  p, 
and y, desired hours h:  may not be feasible since h:  may be greater or less 
than the hours at the end points of the budget segment H, -  and H,.  If 
desired hours are feasible, then we have a tangency of  the indifference 
curve and the budget segment. In the case of  a convex budget set this 
tangency is unique, and we then use our stochastic specification for the 
deviation of  actual hours from desired hours for person j  as 
(1.6)  h,=h;+ql. 
Since observed  hours hl?O,  the stochastic term q,  is assumed  to be 
independent and truncated normal across individuals in the population. 
Thus we  have  a  Tobit specification  for  the hours worked  variable. 
However, if  h,*= 0,  we assume that the individuals do not choose to work 
and so set hl = 0 also. Since the final model has two sources of stochastic 
variation, the interpretation of q, differs from standard models. Here we 
picture the individual faced by a choice among a set of  jobs that differ in 
normal (long-run) hours worked. He chooses that job closest to his h;. 
But observed h,  may differ because of  unexpected layoffs, short time, 
overtime, or poor health. As an empirical matter we find the standard 
deviation of  q, to  be reasonably small, which indicates that individuals are 
successful in matching jobs to their desired hours of  work.Z 
~ 
them above the range of  the standard deduction, we used data from the Statistics of  Income 
which should capture a large proportion of tax avoidance procedures.  But data problems 
will nevertheless remain. It  certainly seems preferable, however, to account for taxes rather 
than to ignore them as is the typical tradition  in the labor supply literature, e.g. Smith 
(1980), in which only one of seven papers recognizes the existence of income taxation. 
2. I disagree with my discussant’s (Heckman’s) remarks about his evidence on the piling 
up of  labor supply at kink points for two reasons. First, the presence of qz  reduces to zero the 
probability that anyone is observed at a kink point. We should still observe a dispersion of 
individuals over the budget set. Second, since the kink points differ for each individual, I do 
not see how a casual look at the data can give us more evidence. Last, he is incorrect in his 
claim that the econometric procedures depend critically on exact knowledge of  the location 
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If  the budget set is nonconvex, hi* is not necessarily unique, because 
multiple tangencies can occur between the indifference curves and the 
budget set. Then h$  is chosen as the tangency leading to  maximum utility, 
which is determined by use of  the corresponding indirect utility function 
from equation (1.4).  We again use the stochastic specification of  equation 
(1.6)  to express the deviation of actual hours from desired hours of work. 
It is interesting to note that, although certain interior kink points in figure 
2.2  in the nonconvex case cannot correspond to desired hours, we might 
still observe them as actual hours of  work due to the stochastic term qj  in 
the model. 
The second source of  stochastic variation in the model arises from a 
distribution of tastes in the population. In line with our previous research 
we specify p to be a truncated normal random variable which falls in the 
interval ( -  a,O). An upper limit of  zero is specified since we assume that 
leisure is a normal good. Thus, as p ranges over the permissible interval, 
there is a certain probability that any amount of  hours corresponds to 
desired hours. As an empirical matter p turns out to be the major source 
of stochastic variation in the model, which confirms our previous findings 
reported in Burtless and Hausman (1978).3 
The estimated results for husbands are presented along with asymp- 
totic standard errors in table 2.1. The coefficients are  generally estimated 
quite precisely, especially the wage and nonlabor income coefficients. 
The socioeconomic variables have coefficients of reasonable magnitude 
except the house equity, which perhaps reflects factors in the mortgage 
credit market and the special tax treatment of  houses. We first note that 
the uncompensated wage coefficient is essentially zero. Not only is the 
estimate close to zero, but the estimated standard error is quite small. In 
the extreme case of  two standard deviations from the estimate for the 
nonconvex  case,  a  change  in  the net  wage of  $1.00 along  a  budget 
segment leads to an expected increase in annual hours worked of  32.5, 
which is less than 2% of  the sample mean. The expected change in hours 
3.  This specification of different tastes for leisure is perhaps the most controversial part 
of  the model since it represents the most marked departure from usual labor supply models 
where coefficients are assumed identical across individuals. There, all population heter- 
ogeneity arises through  the additive disturbance  term qj,  e.g. the labor supply models 
contained in Smith (1980). A further discussion is contained in Hausman (19816). To test 
for robustness  of the specification, I tried different functional forms for the probability 
distribution in Hausman (1980). Also, Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Hausman (1981b) 
used instrumental variable techniques which do not depend on normality assumptions. Nor 
do they depend on the normal good assumption for leisure. The results were quite similar to 
the full maximum likelihood model estimates. I disagree with my discussant’s remarks on 
the robustness of the procedure. My investigations lead me to believe that the procedures I 
use are considerably more robust than the reservation wage model of labor supply with its 
unsupported proportionality assumption. For instance, in his latest estimates, which ignore 
the existence of  taxes (Heckman 1980, p. 229), the estimate of the uncompensated labor 
supply elasticity for wives changes from 2.1  to 4.8,  with only a minor change in econometric 
specification. Both estimates  are quite high,  with  the latter estimate  absurdly so. My 
estimates are considerably more robust to econometric specification, as the labor supply 
elasticities for the three different budget sets of  table 2.2 indicates. 56  Jerry A. Hausman 
Table 2.1  Husbands’ Annual Hours of Work ( x  1,OOO) 
Variable  Convex  Nonconvex 




Children < 6 
Family size 




Standard deviation of  p 











(  ,0170) 
-  ,0011 
(.0108) 
,0026 
(  .0009) 
-  ,1387 
(.  1436) 
,2794 
(.0178) 
-  .I66 
,156 
-  ,120 








(.  153) 
.0113 





-  ,0055 
(.OoOS) 
(.564) 
-  ,0520 
,2862 
(.0540) 
-  ,153 
,141 
-  ,113 
Note:  Asymptotic standard errors  are  presented in  parentheses below  each estimated 
coefficient. 
is only 11.3, while in the convex case the expected change in annual hours 
is 0.2. The finding of  an extremely small uncompensated wage effect is in 
accord with the previous empirical findings. Thus the direct  effect of 
income taxation that reduces the net wage has almost no effect on hours 
worked among husbands. 
However, our results do differ from previous studies in indicating a 
significant  income effect.  Remember that we  allow  a  distribution  of 
preferences in the population. The estimated probability density for the 
nonconvex case is shown in figure 2.4. The distribution has substantial 
skewness since it is the extreme left tail of  the truncated normal distribu- 
tion  with the standard deviation approximately  equal to the mean in 
magnitude.  My previous work has also found this general form even 
when  different  probability  densities  are used,  e.g. Hausman  (1980), 
where a  Weibull  density is  used.  The underlying  parameters of  the 
preference distribution are estimated quite precisely so that the finding is 
not likely to be an accidental occurence. 
Next we present the empirical results for a sample of married women. 
Our  sample consists of the  wives of the males used in the previous section. 57  Stochastic Problems in the Simulation of  Labor Supply 
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Fig. 2.4 
Previous research has indicated that married women’s labor supply deci- 
sions are sensitive to the net wage so that we would expect to find that 
taxes create both an important uncompensated wage effect and an in- 
come effect, as they do for husbands. As previously stated, we treat 
wives’ labor supply decisions conditional on husbands’ earned income. 
Thus wives are considered to be secondary workers, which may not be a 
proper assumption. Since in  our sample labor force  participation  of 
husbands is near 100% while that of wives is near 50%,  perhaps treating 
wives’ earnings conditional on husbands’ earnings is not a particularly 
bad  assumption. However, the crucial question is whether husbands’ 
earnings should enter the wives’ labor supply  decision  as exogenous 
nonlabor income. It is probable that some jointness in decision making 
takes place when the husband adjusts his hours of  work  to his wife’s 
earnings.  A  family labor supply model  would  be able to treat these 
problems better, but here we only provide estimates for the conditional 
model. 
We turn now to the estimates of the labor supply equations which are 
presented in table 2.2. We present estimates for a convexified budget set, 
for the complete nonconvex budget set, and for a nonconvex budget set 
with fixed costs included. First, note that we find substantial uncompen- 
sated wage and income elasticities. For the average woman who is work- 
ing full time we find the uncompensated  wage elasticity to be 0.995 for the 58  Jerry A. Hausman 
Table 2.2  Wives’ Annual Hours ( x  1,000) 
Variables 
Nonconvex with 
Convex  Nonconvex  Fixed Costs 
pp  -  income (1  ,OOOs) 
uk3 
a -  wage 
Intercept 
Family size 
Children < 6 
College education 
Age (35-45) 
Age (45 +  ) 
Health 
Equity 
Fixed costs: intercept 
Fixed costs: kids < 6 
Fixed costs: family size 
01 
Mean of  p 
Standard deviation of  p 
Median of  0 
2.0958 









(  ,3426) 
-  ,7851 
(.4216) 
.2328 
-  ,1066 
-  ,1695 
(.1102) 
(  ,0644) 
(.7274) 
(.0172) 
-  ,4771 






-  ,125 
,112 
-  ,089 
1.7519 















-  ,7205 
-  ,1043 
-  ,3139 
(.4753) 
(  .0039) 






-  .118 
,109 
-  ,085 
2.0216 















-  ,3581 
(.4647) 






(  1.6  106) 
,2801 
(.2386) 
-  ,123 
,113 
-  ,088 
-  ,6903 
-  ,1989 
-  ,2118 
nonconvex results, and a similar magnitude for the convex results, 0.978, 
is found. When fixed costs are added, the uncompensated wage elasticity 
falls to 0.9065. Thus all three estimates indicate that the effect of  the 
income tax in decreasing the net, after-tax wage is important in determin- 
ing wives’ labor supply. Since wives’ net wage is lowered substantially by 
the presence of the “marriage tax,” the tax effect may be much greater 
than if  wives’ earnings were not added to husbands’ earnings for tax 
purposes. On the other hand, we also find an important effect of nonlabor 
income (and actual income). The elasticity at the means is approximately 
-  0.2. This effect causes more wives to go to work, because their hus- 
bands’ earnings are  reduced by taxes. The two effects have opposite signs 59  Stochastic Problems in the Simulation of  Labor Supply 
so that a simulation is needed to evaluate the net effect of the marriage 
tax. 
In this section we have presented our specification of the labor supply 
in the presence of  nonlinear convex budget sets and nonconvex budget 
sets. The stochastic specification has been emphasized since it will play an 
important role in the simulation results. We now consider how the results 
can be used to simulate the effects of tax reform. We emphasize computa- 
tional considerations so that the simulations can be conducted at low or 
moderate costs of computer time. 
2.2  Tax Change Evaluation 
In this section we  develop formulas for expected hours of work, ex- 
pected tax revenue, and expected deadweight loss given our model of 
labor supply and the estimates of the previous section. The main question 
that we attempt to answer is how much attention must be paid to the 
stochastic components of  the specification to obtain accurate estimates. 
We consider both analytical and Monte Carlo approaches to the problem. 
We want to find accurate and low-cost computational techniques which 
permit the use of simulation methodology. At the same time keep in mind 
the typically large samples which are involved in  a simulation. These 
large samples make computational techniques an important considera- 
tion. But the large samples may also allow possible simplifications in 
computational techniques because of  the averaging process used in the 
calculation of  simulation results. 
For a given person j the desired hours of work on budget segment i is 
specified to be 
(2.1)  h, = aw, + Py, + Zjy + q, = h$ + qj , 
where wi; is the net, after-tax wage on segment i and yij is virtual income 
for segment i, i.e. the intercept of segment i extended back to the vertical 
axis in figure 2.1. The vector zj  represents socioeconomic characteristics 
of individual j.  Now if  wij and yij were determined exogenously and a,  p, 
and y were  fixed coefficients, then we  could use the standard linear 
expectation rules to derive Ehij = awij + pyij + Zjy.  Of course, we specify 
p to be distributed randomly in the population in the intervals (- w,O). 
But the extension to stochastic p does not create much difficulty because 
again, given exogenous wij and yij, 
= awtj + pyij + ziy , 60  Jerry A. Hausman 
where pp and up are the underlying parameters of  the nontruncated 
distribution for p, respectively, while + and  are the standard normal 
density function and distribution function, respectively. The problem to 
be faced, then, is that w,,  and y,  are determined by the budget segment 
B,, which  depends on two stochastic components, q, and v, = p, -  p. 
Thus we have the problem that the variables on the right-hand side are 
not determined exogenously. Nor do  we have a simple formula for their 
expectation as we would in the linear simultaneous equations  case. Thus, 
not unexpectedly, we need to consider the complete budget set when 
calculating the conditional  expectation of  hours worked, tax revenue 
paid, or  deadweight loss and account for the “endogeneity” of w,,  and y,. 
It turns out to be the nonlinearity of  the budget set together with the 
distribution of preferences specification which cause the significant costs 
of labor supply simulations. As we indicate below, the solution for that 
part of the p distribution which corresponds to a given budget segment is 
a nontrivial calculation. 
We first  consider  the analytical  conditional  expectation  for  hours 
worked. The expectation is 
As we discussed in the last section for p<pT; the minimum p which causes 
desired hours to be positive (h;  >  0), we assume that actual hours h, = 0. 
Thus equation (2.3) calculates the expectation of  actual hours h, over the 
range for which  desired  hours ht are positive.  The first  sum  in  the 
equation corresponds  to  the case where desired hours fall along a budget 
segment i = 1,m. The range of p values which causes this to happen is 
denoted (p,  p,). Note that in the nonconvex case some segments 
may have the intergral end points equal, which means that desired hours 
will not fall anywhere  on  the segment. It is basically this calculation which 
leads to the greatest expense in simulation since calculation of the uni- 
variate and bivariate integrals is not that costly. The nonconvex budget 
set of  figure 2.2 indicates the possibility of  an indifference curve that is 
tangent to two budget segments simultaneously. Thus in the nonconvex 
case there are  portions of the budget segment which cannot correspond to 
desired hours. For this possibility to happen, the indirect utility function 
of equation (1.4) is equal for a given f3 for two sets of  values of  w,  and y,. 
Calculation of  these p values for each nonconvexity  in the budget set 
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facts that the points of mutual tangency are unknown and that complete 
budget  segments  may  be  skipped  over,  the  computation  of  the 
(Pi -  j,  P,)  for all budget segments i = 1,  rn is a rather complicated task. 
Thus we look for possible simplifications  in simulation to reduce both the 
computer costs and the required programming time. 
The outer integral in equation (2.3) determines desired hours h;(P). 
But actual hours h, = h$@)  + qj.  The inner integral accounts for this 
second source of stochastic variation. Note that for large negative values 
of qi  we have h, <  0. Thus qij  (p) = h$  (P), the minimum value of q  which 
keeps actual hours positive. The second sum in equation (2.3) corre- 
sponds to desired hours falling at one of the rn -  1  curves, or kink points, 
of the budget set. The lower limit to the integral, rij,  again determines the 
range for positive h,. 
Evaluation of the integrals in equation (2.3) is not especially difficult, 
even given the bivariate integrals. Conditioning formulas can be used, 
and known partial fraction expansions for univariate integrals lead to 
quick evaluation. These simplifications follow basically from the linear 
specifications of  h, in  equation  (2.1). Unfortunately,  because of  the 
nonlinearity of  the expenditure function, the computation of  integrals 
becomes considerably more complicated for calculating deadweight loss. 
The expenditure function which corresponds to the indirect utility func- 
tion of  equation (1.4) is 
a  a  Zjr 
P  P2  P 
e(wij,Ui)  = exp( -  Pw,)  Uj -  - wi + -  - -  . 
The nonlinearity arises from P appearing in both the exponential and the 
denominators of the coefficients. For a given p, deadweight loss is mea- 
sured by calculating either the compensated or equivalent variation via 
the expenditure  function  of  equation  (2.4)  and  then  subtracting  off 
compensated taxes paid, using the definition of Diamond and McFadden 
(1974).4  Hausman (1981~)  has demonstrated the necessity of  doing the 
correct Hicksian measure of  consumer surplus because use of the incor- 
rect Marshallian measure can lead to very large errors in calculation of 
the deadweight loss. For calculation of deadweight loss, equation (2.3) is 
altered to account for the deadweight loss for p values which correspond 
to zero hours of work. Otherwise, the general formula remains the same, 
with  the main  difference  that the nonlinear  calculation required for 
deadweight loss makes computation considerably more slow than in the 
case of  hours worked, which is a linear  function of  P. Conditioning 
formulas for  the  integrals  are no longer  applicable,  and  quadrature 
methods to evaluate the univariate and bivariate integrals are now re- 
quired. 
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To evaluate computation techniques we tried four approaches listed in 
order of  decreasing computational burden on a sample of  men in 1975 
from the Panel Study of  Income Dynamics (PSID) data base: 
1. Analytical evaluation, via the computer, of the integrals in equation 
(2.3). For the nonlinear deadweight  loss calculation we  took the pij 
corresponding to the mean p on the interval (pi  -  l,j,pij)  so that complete 
quadrature methods were not necessary to evaluate the integrals. 
2.  The distribution of p was still integrated over, but one Monte Carlo 
draw from a normal distribution was done for qj. 
3. The distribution of  p was integrated over, and qj  was set to zero.5 
4.  p was taken at its mean value 6 = kp  -  ap+(pp/ap)/[l  -  @(pp/ap)]. 
Corresponding to p  we find h@), and qj  is set to zero. This technique 
also removes any need for integration for taxes paid or calculation of 
deadweight loss. 
Note that the second approach leads to unbiased (or consistent) esti- 
mates of the expectation. Such estimates will have more variance than the 
actual expectations of the first approach because of the variance created 
by the Monte Carlo draws. However, we consider a sample of 200 men to 
see whether the appropriate law of  large numbers works fast enough for 
this  consideration not  to be  important.  Potential  bias is  created  by 
approach (3) since the expectation of  q is positive and decreases along 
each segment as pi  increases. Last, approach (4) creates additional bias 
because it  runs afoul of  the rule that the expectation  of  a nonlinear 
function is not equal, in  general, to the function of  the expectation. 
Potential problems arise here for both hours of work and deadweight loss 
because of the nonlinearity of the budget set. 
In table 2.3  we consider the four techniques on the first five men in our 
simulation file to see what happens at the individual level. The column 
labeled “hours” gives actual hours, while the next four columns calculate 
the expectation of hours corresponding to methods (1)-(4).  The next two 
sets of  columns correspond to the expectation  of  taxes paid  and the 
expectation of  deadweight loss using the equivalent variation measure. 
Since method (1) leads to the correct evaluation of the expectation, it 
provides  the standard of  comparison for methods (2)-(4).  For labor 
supply we see that method (2) leads to considerable variance, as ex- 
pected. Method (3), which sets q = 0, gives identical results to method 
(1). Method (4), which takes the mean p,  leads to some bias, although 
only a small amount. For expected taxes paid, methods (3) and (4) again 
have a bias which is somewhat larger in this case. Last, deadweight loss 
seems most sensitive to  the technique used. Techniques (3) and (4) are off 
5. The women’s sample might be better than the men’s sample for testing this option 
because the sensitivity around zero hours for a man is probably quite small. Thus biases are 
not apt to be important for men. However, subsequent simulations have indicated that, 
while the bias is slightly larger for women, it is still probably small enough to be ignored. Table 2.3  Individual Evaluation Methods ( x  1,OOO) 
Expected Hours  Expected Taxes Paid  Expected Deadweight Loss 
Indi-  Actual 
vidual  Hours  H(1)  H(2)  H(3)  H(4)  T(1)  T(2)  T(3)  T(4)  DWL(1)  DWL(2)  DWL(3)  DWL(4) 
1  2.708  2.393  2.136  2.393  2.389  1.105  ,883  1.104  1.100  ,162  .395  .151  .156 
2  1.928  2.097  2.679  2.097  2.101  5.208  7.661  5.165  5.058  2.971  ,993  2.784  2.848 
3  1.994  1.900  2.114  1.900  1.887  2.560  2.934  2.543  2.455  ,449  .401  .401  .4% 
4  2.310  2.233  2.559  2.223  2.245  3.082  3.857  3.061  3.063  1.081  ,337  1.022  1.015 
5  2.121  2.201  1.455  2.201  2.142  1.713  ,814  1.704  1.602  .314  1.974  ,287  .382 
Means  2.212  2.163  2.189  2.163  2.153  2.734  3.230  2.715  2.656  .995  ,820  ,929  ,997 64  Jerry A. Hausman 
by  about 7%  in these calculations.  Thus our tentative conclusion for 
individual calculations is that for labor supply and taxes paid method (3) 
is probably an appropriate technique to use  .6 However, for deadweight 
loss, full analytical evaluation of the integrals seems necessary for accu- 
rate calculation of  the expectation. 
We now turn to the major use of  simulation for tax changes. We 
simulate over a file of approximately 225 men from the PSID file to see 
what happens to accuracy for mean changes. This file was found large 
enough to capture the limiting  behavior  of  the  different  evaluation 
methods. Note that a substantial amount of computer processing time is 
involved here.’ Taking the amount of  time to do method (1) as unity, we 
find that method (2) takes 0.560 while method (3) takes 0.500 and method 
(4) takes 0.360 as long. Where many simulations are done over tax files 
that have thousands of  entries, these time considerations can become 
quite important. Given the nonlinearity of  the problem, the simulations 
can take up large amounts of  computer time. 
Simulation results are given in table 2.4. We now find that method (2) 
gives almost identical results to method (1) for hours and taxes. This 
result is as expected since the Monte Carlo method should give accurate 
computations once the law of large numbers has had time to take effect. 
Method (3) is fine for hours, but it is note quite as good for taxes. 
Moreover, it offers only a very slight savings over method (2). Method (4) 
probably can be rated as unsatisfactory given the size of  tax changes that 
we are usually interested in evaluating. For deadweight loss calculations, 
method (2) is off  by about 4%. The other two methods are off  by double 
that amount. Here we might conclude that larger samples are probably 
needed for method (2) to be sufficiently accurate. Methods (3) and (4) 
might be rejected as too inaccurate to evaluate proposed tax changes. 
Thus we may conclude this section with the finding that methods (2) and 
(3) are both appropriate for use in the evaluation of  tax change on labor 
supply and taxes. For computation of  deadweight loss, where nonlineari- 
ties  become  important, only  method  (2)  is  approximately  accurate. 
However, for samples of  the size we are considering, method (l),  which 
involves  calculation  of  all  the integrals  involved  in  the expectation, 
provides the only truly accurate  method. The appropriate next step in this 
line of  research  is to develop formulas for the (asymptotic) standard 
errors which correspond to the results in table 2.4. Given the nonlineari- 
ties inherent in  the calculation of  hours, taxes, and deadweight loss, 
asymptotic expansions would be used to account for the uncertainty in 
the parameter estimates. But the accuracy of these techniques might be 
6.  Method (4) may also be satisfactory for a first approximation. 
7.  While relative computer costs are difficult to compare, asimulation on the full sample 
of 1,000 families on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology IBM 370 computer costs 
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Table 2.4  Full Sample Evaluation Methods: Mean Response ( X  1,000) 
Method  Hours  Taxes  DWL 
1  2.169  2.268  ,652 
2  2.165  2.267  ,676 
3  2.169  2.251  ,608 
4  2.138  2.153  ,709 
questionable here. Evaluation of  the accuracy of the expansions would 
require a full-scale Monte Carlo study in itself. Yet such information 
might be very helpful, especially if the standard errors for the calculations 
in table 2.4 turn out to be sizable. We need to  remember that “parameter 
uncertainty”  does not average out by a large-numbers type of  result in 
simulations because of  perfect correlation across sample draws in the use 
of parameter values. This area seems to  be an important aspect of future 
research in the field. We now turn to evaluation of  some proposed tax 
changes. Method (3)  is used for expected hours and expected taxes, while 
we use method (1) to evaluate expected changes in deadweight loss. 
2.3  Simulation Results 
In  this  section we  consider the effect of  two different types of  tax 
systems. The first type of  tax is the current federal tax on labor income 
including both the income and payroll tax. We compare it to a no-tax 
situation. To measure the change in labor supply we calculate the change 
in expected hours of work using equation (2.3). The appropriate choice 
for the change in individual welfare is not quite as clear. We use the 
equivalent variation calculated from the expenditure function of equa- 
tion (2.4). Choice of  the equivalent variation  as the measure of dead- 
weight loss, or  the excess burden of taxation, seems appropriate since we 
later consider changes from the current system to an altered tax system. 
Since in the altered tax system individual welfare may be higher, we want 
to know the cost (in utility) of staying with the current system. But two 
possible  objections to our measure  is  that we  aggregate across  indi- 
viduals, giving each individual  the same weight in  the implicit social 
welfare function, and that different  individuals  are allowed  different 
coefficients in  their expenditure functions. The problems  created for 
analysis of  vertical equity considerations by these choices are discussed in 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The latter problem may not be especially 
serious since parameter differences arise from a distribution of  prefer- 
ences which is common to the entire population. 
The other type of  tax system that we consider involves a cut in tax rates 
of  a given percentage. We consider the expected change in labor supply, 
the expected change in tax revenue, and the expected change in dead- 66  Jerry A. Hausman 
Table 2.5  Mean  Tax Results for Husbands 
Change in 
Market  DWL/Tax  DWWNet  Labor 
Wage  DWL  Revenue  Income  Supply 
$3.15  $  66  9.470  370  -  4.5% 
$4.72  $  204  14.4%  2.0%  -6.5% 
$5.87  $  387  19.0%  3.1%  -8.5% 
$7.06  $  633  23.7%  4.5%  -  10.1% 
$10.01  $1,749  39.5%  9.9%  -  12.8% 
weight loss from the current system. Much recent attention has focused 
on the revenue effects of a change in the income tax rates. It is important 
to note that our analysis is whollypartial equilibrium in nature. We look 
only at changes in expected labor supply. Thus potentially important 
factors such as changes in market wages and changes in inputs of  other 
factors  of  production  are  not  considered. A  more  complex general 
equilibrium model is needed to answer these questions. Also, since tax 
revenues will be decreasing, the problem of  compensation arises. The 
problem  of  potential versus actual compensation was the basis of  the 
Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky-Samuelson-Little  debate of  the 1940s. Without 
the choice of  an explicit social welfare function we cannot resolve this 
problem.  But we assume no posttax  redistribution  of  income among 
individuals, since such actual (rather than potential) compensation is 
unlikely to take place. 
In table 2.5  we  look at the effect of  the current tax system for five 
categories of  husbands defined by their market wage.' Overall, we find 
that the tax system decreases the labor supply by 8.5% and that the mean 
deadweight loss as a proportion of tax revenue raised is 28.7%. We note 
important differences among the five categories. First, we see that dead- 
weight loss rises rapidly with the market wage as expected. In terms of the 
welfare cost of  the tax we  see that the ratio of  deadweight loss to tax 
revenue raised starts at 9.4% and rises to 39.5% by the time we reach the 
highest wage category. We see that the cost of  raising revenue via the 
income and payroll taxes is not negligible. In terms of  a distributional 
measure we see that the ratio of deadweight loss to net income also rises 
rapidly.  In fact, this measure indicates that individuals in the highest 
wage category bear a cost about ten times the lowest category while 
individuals in the second highest category bear a cost five times as high. 
Without a specific social welfare measure, we cannot decide whether the 
8. When we refer to the current tax system, we are actually using the 1975 data, which 
the model was estimated with. However, except for the rise in social security contributions, 
the taxation of labor income has not changed significantly since 1975. Of course, individuals 
on average have moved into higher marginal tax brackets because of  the lack of  indexation 
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current tax system has too much, too little, or about the right amount of 
progressiveness. But the measures of  table 2.5 seem important in think- 
ing about the problem. Last, note that the change in labor supply from 
the no-tax situation again rises with the wage category. The high marginal 
tax brackets have a significantly greater effect on labor supply than do the 
low tax brackets. 
We now do a similar set of  calculations for our sample of wives. While 
we found both  significant deadweight loss and an important effect on 
labor supply for husbands compared to the no-tax situation, the situation 
is more complicated for wives. First, about half of all wives do not work. 
In the absence of an income tax, the net wage would rise, causing some of 
them to decide to work and others to increase their labor supply. But at 
the same time their husbands’ after-tax earnings would also rise, which 
has the opposite effect on labor force participation. Thus both effects 
must be accounted for in  considering the effects of  the income tax. 
Overall for wives, (in table 2.6), we find the ratio of deadweight loss to tax 
revenue  to  be  18.4%. But  it  should  be  remembered  that  this ratio 
understates the effect on labor force participants alone. For labor supply, 
we find that taxes serve to increase the labor supply in the lowest wage 
category but decrease the labor supply as the wage rises. Overall, they 
decrease the labor supply by 18.2%. Thus, again for wives we see that the 
current income tax system both has an important labor supply effect and 
imposes a significant cost in welfare terms for raising tax revenue. 
We now turn to a consideration of  tax proposals of  the Kemp-Roth 
type. We will consider two levels of tax cuts, 10% and 30%. The question 
which has been focused on most is what effect these tax cuts would have 
on tax  revenues.  Our results are partial equilibrium so that  general 
equilibrium effects are not accounted for. The main effect here arises 
from the change in labor supply. But increased hours also move some 
individuals into higher tax brackets. Both effects need to be accounted 
for. In table 2.7 we present two Kemp-Roth simulation results. For the 
10% tax deduction the mean hours of labor supply for husbands rise 22.5 
hours, or 1.1%. Tax revenues fall by 7.4%. Even given the fact that our 
Table 2.6  Mean Tax Results for Wives 
Change in 
Market  DWL/Tax  DWL/Net  Labor 
Wage  DWL  Revenue  Income  Supply 
$2.11  $  23  4.6%  .3%  +31.2% 
$2.50  $  119  15.3%  1.3%  -  14.2% 
$3.03  $  142  15.9%  1.5%  -  20.3% 
$3.63  $  184  16.5%  1.7%  -23.8% 
$5.79  $1,283  35.7%  8.6%  -22.9% 68  Jerry A. Hausman 
Table 2.7  Kemp-Roth Tax Cut Proposals for Husbands 
10% Tax Cut  30% Tax Cut 
Change in  Change in 
Market  DWLiTax  DWL/Net  Labor  DWUTax  DWLiNet  Labor 
Wage  Revenue  Income  Supply  Revenue  Income  Supply 
$3.15  8.5%  .7%  + .4%  6.8%  .4%  + 1.3% 
$4.72  13.3%  1.7%  + .5%  10.9%  1.1%  +1.6% 
$5.87  17.4%  2.6%  + .9%  14.5%  1.8%  +2.7% 
$7.06  21.8%  3.8%  + 1.1%  17.9%  2.5%  +3.1% 
$10.01  36.1%  8.2%  + 1.4%  29.5%  5.3%  +4.6% 
model is partial equilibrium, rudimentary calculations demonstrate that 
general equilibrium effects are very unlikely to be large enough to cause 
tax revenues from decreasing significantly in the short run, as our results 
show. In terms of  the welfare cost of the tax we see that the deadweight 
loss falls significantly. The ratio of mean deadweight loss to tax revenue 
falls from 22.1% under the current system to 19.0% under the 10% tax 
cut plan. For the 30% tax cut labor supply increases by 2.7% while tax 
revenue falls by 22.6%. Again, we see that deadweight loss decreases 
significantly and the ratio of  deadweight  loss to tax  revenues  raised 
decreases to 15.4%. In terms of distributional changes the top quintile 
has the greatest increase in utility as a ratio to net income. Thus, as 
expected, decreasing taxes by a constant percentage reduces deadweight 
loss but does so in a manner most beneficial to those individuals who face 
the highest tax rates. Kemp-Roth type tax cuts have large effects both in 
terms of decreasing deadweight loss and in decreasing government reve- 
nue. Without knowledge of marginal government expenditure, it is dif- 
ficult to evaluate the trade-off. But we cannot recommend Kemp-Roth 
cuts on welfare grounds alone, given the substantial fall in government 
revenue. 
For wives  we  do not present detailed  quintile  results because  the 
overall pattern is similar to the results for husbands. The mean results are 
given in table 2.8. Overall, we see that the labor supply response to a tax 
cut is greater for wives than for husbands. We expect this since the wage 
Table 2.8  Overall Kemp-Roth Tax Cut for Wives 
______~  ~ 
Change in  Change in 
Tax  Tax  Change in  Supply 
cut  Revenue  DWL  (hours) 
10%  -3.8%  -  10.6%  + 50.2 
30%  -  16.2%  -  17.4%  + 117.0 69  Stochastic Problems in the Simulation of  Labor Supply 
elasticity is about twice the income elasticity, so we  should have a net 
increase in labor supply. Furthermore, the difference in the elasticities is 
about four times that of  husbands, and we do observe a significantly 
larger response. For the 10% tax cut case, labor supply increases by 4.1% 
and tax revenues fall by  3.8%. For the 30% tax cut case, labor supply 
increases by 9.4% and tax revenues fall by  16.2%. 
Our overall evaluation of  the Kemp-Roth tax proposals is that while 
tax revenues will decrease by significantly less than the tax cut, overall 
government revenue from the income and payroll tax will decline. An 
argument might be made that general equilibrium results may be large 
enough to reverse this conclusion, but I doubt that it is a valid argument, 
especially in the short run. Thus, unless a strong argument can be made 
for reducing government expenditures with little welfare loss from the 
recipients, the Kemp-Roth tax cut proposals cannot be supported on the 
basis of  our results alone. They certainly do not have the “free lunch” 
properties claimed by  some of  their supporters. 
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Comment  James J. Heckman 
In his paper Hausman applies econometric methods developed in the 
literature on sample selection bias and censored samples to estimate 
labor  supply  behavior  in  response  to various  forms  of  tax  policies. 
“Kinked” convex and nonconvex budget constraints receive the lion’s 
share of the attention in the analysis. Various methods of simulating the 
estimates are then proposed and implemented. 
I have little to say about Hausman’s simulation procedures. To discuss 
simulation of the estimates before discussing the quality of the estimates 
puts the cart before the horse. I have reservations about the input used in 
the simulation procedures and feel that it is premature to use the esti- 
mates offered by Hausman as a serious guide to assessing the impact of 
alternative tax policies on labor supply. 
My principal reservations about his estimates focus on the specification 
of  the budget set confronting individuals that is used in the empirical 
work and on the econometric specification of  the labor supply equations. 
Before turning to these issues, however, it is useful to place the current 
work in context. 
Kosters’s (1967) pioneering work on labor supply was based on the 
following key assumptions: (a) taxes are proportional, (b)  a worker is 
free to choose any hours of  work at “his” wage, (c)  the income of  one 
spouse is predetermined in the labor supply of  the other (for married 
workers). Boskin (1973) and Hall (1973) relaxed (a)  and (c) while retain- 
ing (b).  The standard tax deduction formula is used to compute effective 
marginal tax rates. Tax schedule “kinks” are ignored as a first approxima- 
tion, and the linearization device employed in the Hausman paper for a 
kinked constraint (section 2.1) was used to parameterize the effective 
after-tax wage confronting the worker. Both Boskin and Hall replace the 
income of  the spouse (where appropriate) with the theoretically more 
correct wage. The main empirical findings reported in these and other 
papers done at the same time suggested a backward-bending male labor 
supply function (for hours worked for most groups) and strong positive 
wage effects for most female groups (both hours worked and participa- 
tion). A persistent empirical problem in this literature is the often statisti- 
cally insignificant and sometimes positive effect of  measures of  “exoge- 
nous income” on labor supply. The range of male labor supply estimates 
is 0.19 to 0.07 for the uncompensated substitution effect, but this range is 
by no means universally accepted. (For a survey see Heckman, Killings- 
worth, and MaCurdy 1981.) 
James J. Heckman is with the Department of  Economics at the University of Chicago, 
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Rosen (1976) relaxed  (b)  using  a  hedonic  model  that arises from 
explicit consideration of  employer interests in employee hours of  work. 
His empirical findings on the wage-hours locus have been confirmed in 
later work. Rosen also utilizes a variant of the Boskin-Hall procedure to 
compute effective taxes facing individuals. 
Hausman follows in the tradition of  Boskin and Hall but focuses on 
several important problems overlooked in their work. First, Boskin and 
Hall both ignore the simultaneity problem that arises in using computed 
marginal and average tax rates. The point here is simple but empirically 
important. Given a nonproportional tax, the computed tax rate depends 
on the error in the labor supply equation. Putting tax-adjusted wage rates 
and virtual income levels on the right-hand side of  a labor supply equa- 
tion (as do Boskin and Hall) creates a standard simultaneous bias prob- 
lem. Hausman’s procedure attempts to avoid this sort of  bias.’ Second, 
Boskin and Hall both ignore the kinks at various levels of adjusted gross 
income in the official tax tables. In a progressive system there should be 
bunching at the kinks. Individuals at these kinks are at a corner equilib- 
rium in their labor supply so that the textbook theory of  labor supply must 
be modified, albeit in a straightforward way. Because of these kinks, the 
standard instrumental  variable solution  to the first problem does not 
work. Besides addressing these issues, Hausman also explicitly allows for 
individual heterogeneity in preferences following up on the work of  Hall 
(1975) and Heckman (1974). He demonstrates, as had the papers cited, 
that there is  considerable  dispersion  in  preferences  for work  in  the 
population. Finally, Hausman follows Cogan (1980,1981) in introducing 
fixed costs into the analysis of  labor supply. 
There are few original ideas contained in this paper.  However, the 
synthesis of the work of  others is interesting. The main contribution of 
the paper is the development of  computational algorithms. Hausman 
takes the textbook one-period labor supply model and imposes it onto his 
data in  order to secure estimates and generate policy simulations.  In 
doing so he ignores a considerable body of  accumulated empirical evi- 
dence that casts doubt on the validity of  the textbook model. Hausman’s 
procedures critically depend on access to data that he does not have and 
that economists are unlikely to have in the near future. 
This paper is a microeconometric counterpart of  the standard mac- 
roeconometric exercise that was conducted in the 1960s when the consen- 
sus view was that the remaining research agenda in that field was a matter 
of “fine tuning.” Hausman adopts the view that was assumed then, that 
1. Rosen also discusses this point, but his solution--evaluating  tax rates at a standard 
hours of  work position-trades  a simultaneous equation bias for an induced measurement 
error  bias that  is  likely to  be  very  sizable.  This general problem in  the  Boskin-Hall 
procedure has been noted by many analysts. See the survey in Heckman, Killingsworth,  and 
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there is agreement on the validity of  the simple theory, that the basic 
empirical facts are well known, and that all that is required to produce 
policy forecasts is a simply computed algorithm. Would that it were so. 
My comments on this paper are directed toward the general research 
strategy and the specific procedures used to achieve the estimates re- 
ported in Hausman’s paper. In particular, I discuss the following topics: 
(1) The specification of  the choice set facing individuals. (2) The arbi- 
trary, and sometimes very controversial, functional forms and distribu- 
tional assumptions that are imposed onto the data in order to secure 
estimates. (3) The economic interpretation of  consumer surplus mea- 
sures and deadweight losses in the presence of heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences. 
The Choice Set 
There is no question that kinks appear in adjusted gross income tax 
schedules if  they are properly measured. Kinked nonconvex constraints 
characterize many social programs and social experiments. 
I am surprised to find so much discussion of the econometrics of  kinks 
in the Hausman paper without empirical demonstration of  the impor- 
tance of  the problem.  Specifically, I refer  to the  bunching that  one 
expects to find in the presence of  convex preferences and kinks. There 
should be some piling up of labor supply at kink points. I know of no such 
evidence, and in looking casually at the CES data for 1972 I find no 
evidence of such bunching. Of course one reason for finding no bunching 
is that it is very difficult to compute the correct kink points for a consumer 
unless we known itemizations and deductions. Hausman’s econometric 
procedures rely critically on the assumption that kink points are known to 
the econometrician, a point I elaborate below. I question, in practice, 
whether they are in fact known. Another “reason” for the absence of 
evidence on the importance of  kinks is the ad hoc assumption built into 
Hausman’s model that workers are forced off their preferred labor supply 
curve by exogenous shocks that are independent of  the preferences and 
resources of  workers. 
I am also surprised to find so little attention devoted in this paper and in 
the literature in general to the problem of tax avoidance and labor supply. 
The problem strikes me as more important than the problem of  kinks. 
Rational economic behavior  suggests that individuals will  devote re- 
sources to avoid taxes and that they will take advantage of tax subsidies 
on goods such as housing, Tax rates computed from standard tables (as 
Hausman computes his tax rates) will  overstate the true tax rate paid. 
Dollar taxes paid will understate the true cost of  the tax by  the direct 
avoidance costs (even abstracting from labor supply adjustments). Dollar 
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(including avoidance costs). In the appendix I sketch a very simple model 
to demonstrate these points. 
There I demonstrate that for a plausible tax avoidance function, esti- 
mates, such as  Hausman’s, that ignore tax avoidance behavior understate 
true income and overstate estimated income effects, leading to an over- 
estimate of  welfare losses. The true kink point confronting consumers 
varies in a manner that depends on consumer preferences for goods that 
are subsidized by the tax system (e.g. housing) and resources available to 
the consumer. This means that  Hausman’s  econometric procedures, 
which require the econometrician to compute individual taxes, are in- 
appropriate in the absence of  detailed information about consumption 
behavior. 
There is the additional complication that, because some goods are 
subsidized by the tax system, the simple two-dimensional labor supply 
analysis utilized by Hausman is inappropriate. It is appropriate to analyze 
labor supply and a composite good “consumption” only if the tax system 
does not subsidize the consumption of specific items such as housing. But 
it does. Numerical estimates of  the bias from this source are not yet 
possible.  The Hausman model  is  misspecified  because  it  omits such 
relative  price  effects induced  by  the tax system. This point  helps to 
explain the apparently (perverse) positive effect of  home equity on labor 
supply reported in table 2.1. 
In the appendix, I present a model for incorporating tax avoidance 
effects into the analysis of labor supply and offer some rough estimates of 
the empirical importance of the phenomenon. If my numbers hold up in 
further investigation, the bias from neglecting tax avoidance is consider- 
able. 
I  next  turn to a point  to which  I  have  alluded several times: that 
Hausman’s  econometric  procedures require that the budget set confronting 
the consumer be known to the econometrician.  * Because of considerable 
unobserved  variability  in  deductions  and  exemptions  that  is  not 
accounted for in Hausman’s tax computation algorithm, and because for 
some groups of workers (primarily females) wages must be estimated, the 
true position  of  the budget  set is  not  known  to the econometrician. 
Hausman only allows two types of  variability in the model (in the income 
coefficient p and in the discrepancy between actual and desired hours of 
work). Measurement error in specifying the budget set introduces  a third 
type of  variability that cannot be represented as either of the first two 
types.  Thus his maximum likelihood procedure, which requires  a full 
accounting for all sources of  variability  in order to deliver consistent 
estimates of  the structural parameters of the model, does not produce 
2.  Hausman claims that this is not so in his footnote 2, but there is no demonstration of 
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consistent estimates. This is so because the after-tax wages used in his 
formula (1.4) are measured with error as are the segments on the labor 
supply axis that purport to correspond to the after-tax wages. Using 
imputed after-tax wages from his procedure, one computes the wrong 
probability that an individual desires to be on a given branch of a budget 
set if  the budget set is not correctly specified. As a consequence, Haus- 
man’s estimators are inconsistent. 
These problems are not insurmountable, but they are not addressed, 
much less solved, in any of  Hausman’s papers. An exact analysis of  the 
magnitude of the bias that results from this source is difficult. Roughly 
speaking, in a group of  otherwise identical individuals those with more 
taste for work have greater incentive to avoid taxes. Under Hausman’s 
imputation scheme, such people are allocated to a higher tax bracket than 
they  actually face.  Substitution effects are overstated,  leading to an 
overestimate of computed welfare losses. Neglecting dispersion in wage 
rates by assigning average wages to individuals tends to lead to a down- 
ward  bias  (in absolute  value)  in  estimated substitution  effects. This 
second effect would be most pronounced for women (for whom wages are 
more likely to be imputed), perhaps accounting in part for Hausman’s 
relatively low estimated substitution elasticity for women. (See Heck- 
man, Killingsworth, and MaCurdy 1981 for a survey of recent results on 
the labor supply of  women.) 
For more detailed discussion of this topic, see Heckman and MaCurdy 
(1981, pp. 88-95,  especially pp. 92-93).  The essential point made there is 
that errors in variables problems in  general nonlinear models, such as 
Hausman’s, require more careful analysis than has been  accorded to 
them in the literature. In light of  this point, I cannot help but speculate 
that previous empirical procedures such as those of Boskin and Hall that 
incorporate less (false) information into the estimation procedure may be 
more robust than procedures such as Hausman’s which assume informa- 
tion that does not exist and which produce inconsistent estimators if  the 
information is false. 
The Imposition of  Functional Forms and Prior “Information” 
In light of the long-standing empirical controversy surrounding the sign 
of the income effect (p), I feel that it is inappropriate to impose negativity 
onto the estimates as Hausman does. This point is particularly important 
in .the estimates of the male labor supply equation. Hausman’s estimated 
substitution effect (a)  is essentially zero. By imposing a negative income 
effect onto the data by his econometric procedure, Hausman guarantees 
that  his  procedure  will  produce  a  larger  compensated  substitution 
effect-and  hence a larger welfare loss-than  other studies have. At a 
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test of  Hausman’s assumptions that the mean of p and the largest popula- 
tion value of p are negative should be performed. This point is especially 
relevant in light of previous published results by Burtless and Hausman 
(1978, p. 1124), who report that when p is permitted to become positive, 
the estimated mean value of  p is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
Hausman justifies the imposition of a nonpositive value of p by appeal- 
ing to the argument that leisure is a normal good. Much previous research 
indicates that when p is not restricted, it frequently is estimated to be 
positive (as in fact is the coefficient on house equity in Hausman’s table 
2. l-which  coefficient can be interpreted as estimating p multiplied by 
the rate of  return on housing stock). There are two reasons for this 
(Heckman  1971; Greenberg and  Kosters  1973; Smith  1980): (a) the 
endogeneity of  assets in a life-cycle model of  labor supply, and (6)  the 
correlation between  preferences for work and savings. These papers 
indicate that the standard one-period model of  labor supply as used by 
Hausman must be modified to produce useful results. Hausman chooses 
to ignore all of this research and decides the matter by fiat. For this reason 
his estimates, which ignore life-cycle  phenomena and the endogeneity of 
assets, are not to be taken as serious guides to policy. 
A  similar remark  applies to the use  of  functional forms to secure 
estimates of fixed costs and other unobservables. The new game in labor 
supply, pioneered by Cogan (1980, 1981), is to interpret departures of 
estimated labor supply functions from a simple functional form as evi- 
dence for the presence of fixed costs and the dispersion of preferences. In 
the appendix, I indicate how this game can be played to produce esti- 
mates of  tax avoidance parameters. 
There is much  accumulating evidence (Heckman and Singer 1982; 
Goldberger 1981; Duncan 1981) that parameter estimates of  nonlinear 
models of the sort estimated by Hausman are very sensitive to the choice 
of functional form of the model and the distributions of unobservables. In 
light of  this recent  work, I am very uneasy that so much  mileage is 
obtained  from  imposing  arbitrary,  and  intrinsically untestable,  non- 
linearities and distributional assumptions onto the data in order to secure 
labor supply estimates. I am not as negative as Hausman on the more 
modest empirical procedures used by previous analysts who make less 
grandiose claims about the validity of their models and use less “informa- 
tion”  in  securing labor supply estimates. Given our current  state of 
knowledge about labor supply, there should be less “fine tuning” and 
more insight if  the sort of bold claims made in the Hausman paper are to 
be taken seriously. Much more evidence on the robustness of  the esti- 
mates reported in this paper to departures from the assumptions of  the 
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The Implications of  Heterogeneity on the 
Calculation of  Welfare Losses 
In light of  Hausman’s finding (and that of  previous analysts Hall 1975 
and Heckman 1974) that there is considerable heterogeneity in consumer 
marginal rates of  substitution between goods and leisure, the interpreta- 
tion to be placed on the reported estimates of welfare loss is not clear. 
Hausman notes this point  in his paper, but does not discuss it in any 
detail. His estimates overstate the true amount of compensation that the 
society must be paid to be just as well off as before a tax change because 
the society can redistribute  income among heterogeneous consumers, 
and Hausman’s estimates assume that no redistribution occurs. 
Miscellaneous Comments and a Summary 
I agree with Hausman’s conclusion th’at  the Kemp-Roth tax cut propos- 
als will not produce a free lunch. A reading of the estimates derived in the 
pre-Hausman literature on labor supply supports this conclusion. Haus- 
man’s numerical results offer another shred of evidence that supports  the 
view held by  most economists that the Laffer curve has no empirical 
foundation in the labor supply literature. 
I am less convinced by the estimates of  welfare losses due to income 
taxes that are presented in his paper. For reasons already advanced, 
Hausman’s procedures tend to  produce inflated  estimates of  welfare 
losses. 
Appendix  A Simple, Econometrically  Tractable Model 
of  Tax Avoidance and Labor Supply 
Let  U(X,L)  be the preference function  of  the consumer. X  is goods 
consumption, and L is leisure. 0s  L 5  1. Let the tax function facing the 
consumer be proportional. The after-tax fraction of  income received is 
0(A),  where A  is  dollar  avoidance  costs,  0’(A)rO, 0”(A)50,  lim 
0(A) I  1. For simplicity, avoidance is assumed to be nondeductible and 
nonutility bearing.g  The wage is W,  and the consumer can freely choose 
his hours of work. R is his unearned income. 
A-S 
3. The specification of  the tax avoidance function _warrants  some discussion. A more 
general analysis would write taxes paid after avoidance Tas  a function of  taxes paid with no 
avoidance 7‘  and avoidance expenditure A:  = F(T,A)  with FA  <O and F(T,O) = T.  The 
consumer’s problem is to maximize tax saving less avoidance cost (T -  T)  -  A.  A sufficient 
condition for an interior solution is FAA  >O and aFIdA < -  1 for A = 0 and all T>  0. 
Specializing Fso that 7  = Tcp(A)  with cp(0) = 1,  cp’ <  0, cp”>  0, for a strictly proportional 
income tax t,  the 8 function adopted in the text is €)(A)  = 1 -  t cp(A). 
For a kinked tax schedule expressed in terms of  total income Y, 
Y=R+W(l-L), 
T=t,Y  YSY,, 
7‘=r,Y,+r,(Y-Y,)  Y>Y,, 
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The consumer’s problem is 
max U(X,L)  s.t. O(A)(R  + W(l -L)) -  PX -  A = 0 . 
There is a prior maximization problem: First choose A.  The first-order 
condition is 
O’(A)(R  + W(l -  L))  = 1 . 
For R >  0, @’(A)  <  0 is sufficient. As income increases, avoidance expend- 
itures increase. The standard tax table reveals O(0).  The computed mar- 
ginal tax rate, as a function of income, is @(A),  which is always less than 
O(0). 1 -  O(A)  is the effective marginal tax rate. 
The effect of  tax avoidance is to make the true tax function more 
concave.  A  progressive tax  table may appear as regressive after tax 
avoidance occurs. Consider a proportional tax. Figure C2.A.  1 displays 
the table after-tax income after avoidance for the case O”’<O.  Figure 
C2.A.2 demonstrates the apparent budget set confronting the consumer, 
the tax table schedule, and the true constraint (inclusive of  tax avoid- 
ance).  In investigating the labor force participation  decision using  a 
constraint computed from the standard table, we understate true income 
and overstate estimated income effects. Using the apparent schedule 
(ignoring A)  underestimates  income  effects.  Substitution effects are 
overestimated. The effect on computed welfare losses (ignoring A)  of 
estimates computed from the standard tables is to overstate the true 
welfare loss for two reasons: (a)  the estimated compensated substitution 
effect is overestimated and (b)  the true tax change of  any computed tax 
change is smaller. Including A,  this effect is partially but never com- 
pletely offset. Below, I present preliminary estimates that suggest that 
these effects may be empirically quite strong. 
Analogous results hold for the case of  a kinked progressive standard 
tax table. The true constraint has a kink, and in the neighborhood of each 
kink point the slope of the true schedule to the right of  the kink exceeds 
the slope of the true schedule to the left of  the kink (see footnote 3). For 
sufficiently high after-tax income, the true marginal tax rate to the left of 
the kink may be less than the true marginal tax rate to the right of  the 
For optimal values of A,  0 is a continuous function of Y but is not a continuously differenti- 
able function of  Y.  In the neighborhood of  Y,,  the derivative of income after taxes and 
avoidance cost to the left of  Y1  exceeds the derivative of income after taxes and avoidance 
cost to the right of Y1.  To see this, note that optimal A is a continuous function of Y and to 
the  right  of  Y,  using  the  envelope  theorem,  income  after  taxes  and  avoidance  cost 
E( = Y -  -?i -  A)  has the derivative dE/dY = 1 -  f2+(A), Y>  Y,,  while the derivative of E 
with respect to Y to the left of  Y,  is aElaY = 1 -  [,+(A). 78  Jerry A. Hausman 
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Fig. C2.A.1  Income after avoidance and table after-tax  income as functions 
of  income before tax. 
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Fig. C2.A.2  Apparent constraint, true constraint, and tax table constraint 
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kink. This case is illustrated for a one-kink standard tax table in figure 
C2.A.3. There is a further complication that may be empirically quite 
important and which may cause the kink to disappear from the data. If  tax 
avoidance costs can be written off in part and we cannot observe A, we 
may not be able to locate the abscissa of the kink in the figure. The same is 
true if  avoidance is broadened to consider a variety of  purchases and 
deductions not directly observed that affect adjusted gross income. The 
true kink point may vary in a population of  consumers with the same 
wage and unearned income. 
If  A  has a utility-bearing aspect (e.g. the subsidy on owned homes 
versus rented homes), a slightly more complicated analysis is required. 
The price of  A  depends on income. In a multigood world, the Hicks 
composite  commodity theorem  no longer  applies so that  the simple 
composite  good  used  to derive indifference  curves (or  labor  supply 
functions) and to specify the constraint set no longer holds. The after-tax 
price of A belongs in the labor supply function, and the computation of 
welfare loss requires a multidimensional analysis. 
Is any of  this empirically important? Since A cannot be observed, it 
may be argued that the preceding analysis is of little empirical relevance. 
This argument is incorrect. If the sort of strong functional form assump- 
tions used by Hausman and Cogan to estimate unobservable fixed costs 
are adopted, it is also possible to estimate A. For the sake of brevity we 
only consider an apparent proportional tax case. 
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Fig. C2.A.3  True  constraint  and  tax  table constraint for  the case  of  a 
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Let O(A) = k -  b/(A  + 1),  so the apparent tax rate is k -  b (for A = 0). 
Then income after taxes and tax avoidance is (letting h = 1 -  L) 
[Wh + R][k]  -  b’I2[Wh  + R]’” + 1 . 
Adopt a linear labor supply specification as a maintained assumption. 
Then, linearizing the true budget constraint in the fashion suggested by 
Hall and Boskin, the true marginal wage is 
w k -  -  b112  [  Wh + R]  ”’1  I: 
and virtual income is 
1 + Rk -  b’”  [Wh  + R]’/’+ Whb1/2i[Wh  + R]-’I2 , 
2 




h = aW[k -  -  6”’  [Wh  + R]-’/’ 
+ p Rk -  bl”[Wh  +  + Whb’I2  I 
1 
x  -[W/Z+R]-’/~+~  1  +Z~+E. 
2 
Since we  know k -  b, we can estimate a,  b, k, and p. Thus we can 
compute welfare losses. Because of the nonlinearity of  the reduced form 
h function, we may use polynomials in Z as instruments. Modification of 
the analysis to a kinked convex case is a trivial extension. 
If  we have access to reported taxes, a simpler procedure is available so 
that it is not necessary to resort to arbitrary functional form restrictions 
on labor supply functions to estimate tax avoidance. Reported taxes are 
[Wh+R]  1-k+-  [  A+l  I- 
Since A + 1  = b’l2[Wh  + R]”’ from the first-order condition for optimal 
tax avoidance, observed income after taxes is 
Since we know k -  b = +, substitute in the tax function to reach 
[Wh + R][1  -  + -  b]  + bl/’ [Wh  + R]”* . 
Regressing reported taxes on income generates estimates of  b”’.  This 
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How important is this problem? Without a serious analysis of  the data 
on reported taxes  versus taxes  computed from  standard tables,  it  is 
impossible to say. A very rough estimate obtained from the 1972 CES 
data in which taxes paid are reported suggests that b is roughly 10. This 
implies that a person earning $16,000 in adjusted gross income in 1972 
spent about $400 on  tax avoidance. This implies that the true marginal tax 
rate for this person is 25.5% rather than the quoted 28% and that true 
taxes paid (including avoidance) come to about $500 less than what is 
estimated from the standard form. If these results hold up in a thorough 
study, they  suggest that the effect of  ignoring tax avoidance may  be 
empirically quite important. 
It is interesting to note that the effect of  ignoring tax avoidance be- 
havior is to overstate estimated welfare losses. Moreover, a more com- 
prehensive view of  the tax system suggests that more effort might profit- 
ably be devoted to specifying the correct choice set for consumers and 
that econometric methods, such as those advocated by Hausman, that 
require exact  information  on the constraint  set  will  generate biased 
estimates of  tax response. 
It is important to point out that different conclusions would be pro- 
duced  by  other functional forms for the after-tax fraction of  income 
function 0(A).  Much further empirical and theoretical work is required 
before we can be sure that tax avoidance behavior is of  any empirical 
importance. 
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